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Abstract
The global financial crisis has highlighted the limitations of risk-sensitive bank capital ratios.
To tackle this problem, the Basel III regulatory framework has introduced a minimum leverage
ratio, defined as a banks Tier 1 capital over an exposure measure, which is independent of
risk assessment. Using a medium sized DSGE model that features a banking sector, financial
frictions and various economic agents with differing degrees of creditworthiness, we seek to
answer three questions: 1) How does the leverage ratio behave over the cycle compared with
the risk-weighted asset ratio? 2) What are the costs and the benefits of introducing a leverage
ratio, in terms of the levels and volatilities of some key macro variables of interest? 3) What
can we learn about the interaction of the two regulatory ratios in the long run? The main
answers are the following: 1) The leverage ratio acts as a backstop to the risk-sensitive capital
requirement: it is a tight constraint during a boom and a soft constraint in a bust; 2) the net
benefits of introducing the leverage ratio could be substantial; 3) the steady state value of the
regulatory minima for the two ratios strongly depends on the riskiness and the composition of
bank lending portfolios.
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1 Introduction
The global financial crisis has highlighted the limitations of risk-weighted bank capital ratios (reg-
ulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets). Despite numerous refinements and revisions over
the last two decades, the weights applied to asset categories seem to have failed to fully reflect
banks’ portfolio risk causing an increase in systemic risk (Acharya and Richardson (2009), Hellwig
(2010), and Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013)). To tackle this problem the new regulatory frame-
work of Basel III has introduced a minimum leverage ratio, defined as a bank’s Tier 1 capital over
an exposure measure, which is independent of risk assessment (Ingves (2014)).
The aim of the leverage ratio is to act as a complement and a backstop to risk-based capital
requirements. It should counterbalance the build-up of systemic risk by limiting the effects of risk
weight compression during booms. The leverage ratio is therefore expected to act counter-cyclically,
being tighter in booms and looser in busts. If bank capital behaved in this way over the cycle, both
the probability of a crisis and also the amplitude of output fluctuations would be reduced.
The Basel III framework requires that the leverage ratio and the more complex risk-based re-
quirements work together. The leverage ratio indicates the maximum loss that can be absorbed by
equity, while the risk-based requirement refers to a bank’s capacity to absorb potential losses. The
use of a leverage ratio is not new. A similar measure has been in force in Canada and the United
States since the early 1980s (Crawford et al. (2009) and D’Hulster (2009)). Canada introduced the
leverage ratio in 1982 after a period of rapid leveraging-up by its banks, and tightened the require-
ments in 1991. In the United States, the leverage ratio was introduced in 1981 amid concerns over
bank safety due to falling bank capitalization and a number of bank failures (Wall and Peterson
(1987) and Wall (1989)). The introduction of a leverage ratio requirement for large banking groups
was announced in Switzerland in 2009 (FINMA, 2009). Similar requirements have been proposed,
more recently, in other jurisdictions as well, with a view to implementing them by 2018 (BCBS,
2014b).
Motivated by these considerations this paper addresses the following questions:
1. How does the leverage ratio evolve over the cycle compared with the risk-weighted asset ratio?
2. What are the costs and the benefits of introducing a leverage ratio (in terms of level and
volatility of some key variables)?
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3. What can we learn about the interaction of the two regulatory ratios in the long run?
To address these questions we embed the regulator’s problem within a macroeconomic model.
Specifically we build on the DSGE model developed by Angelini et al. (2014) to examine the func-
tioning and shortcomings of risk-based capital regulation and the role of the leverage ratio in miti-
gating the procyclicality problem. This model features a simplified banking sector and heterogene-
ity in the creditworthiness of the various economic agents. The model also features risk-sensitive
capital requirements and a stylized countercyclical capital buffer. We contribute by augmenting
this model in two ways. First, we introduce a leverage ratio, independent of risk assessment, whose
deviation from the minimum requirements produces additional capital adjustment costs. Second,
we allow the risk weights on lending to households and non-financial firms to be different in the
steady state. This modification allows us to mimic the real world setting and generates different
interest rates for the two classes of loans.
However, this framework has a few limitations. This setup does not allow for bank defaults
in equilibrium and does not allow for credit risk materialization. In other words, the models
belonging to this class do not explicitly feature inefficiencies that regulation aims to correct, rather
than assumes it to be exogenously given. It is for these reasons that we will conduct a strictly
positive analysis. We do not address normative questions such as the optimality of the leverage
ratio. Our contribution to the literature lies in the fact that, in contrast to earlier papers, we
model the financial intermediaries such that they are subject to a minimum leverage requirement
in addition to the risk-based capital requirement, in line with one of the main tenets of the Basel
III guidelines. The aim is to study how these ratios interact over the business cycle. The costs and
benefits analyzed are in terms of levels and standard deviations of some key variables of interest.
Our study does not assess the benefits of the leverage ratio in terms of reducing the frequency and
severity of financial crises.
Our main results are as follows: (i) The leverage ratio is more counter-cyclical than the risk-
weighted capital ratio: it is a tight constraint during a boom and a soft constraint in a bust; (ii)
The benefits of introducing the leverage requirement appear to be substantially higher than the
associated costs; and (iii) the steady state values of the two ratios strongly depend on the riskiness
and the composition of lending portfolios. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The
next section discusses the issue of procyclicality and why bank capital regulation is important in
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making the financial system more resilient. Section 3 describes Basel III regulation and presents
some stylized facts on bank capital ratios. Section 4 describes the model, Section 5 presents the
calibration while Section 6 discusses the results.
2 Why is bank capital important?
Bank capital is the part of the bank’s funds that is contributed by the owners or shareholders, as
opposed to external sources of funding which include deposits, inter-bank funding and obligations.
Minimum capital requirements are intended to reduce bank insolvency risk. The main objective
is to make sure that banks have sufficient internal resources to withstand adverse economic shocks
and to improve incentive distortions that are created by a number of market imperfections in the
banking sector.
2.1 Basel regimes
Over time, bank regulators have developed a sophisticated system of solvency regulations that are
intended to increase the safety of individual institutions and the stability of the financial system.
The first Basel Accord (Basel I) was adopted in 1988 by the G-10 with the aim of harmonizing cap-
ital regulation across countries and strengthening the stability of the international banking system
(BCBS, 1988). The framework was designed to encourage banks to increase their capital positions
and to make regulatory capital more sensitive to banks’ perceived credit risks. Accordingly, as-
sets and off-balance sheet activities were assigned risk weights between 0 and 100% according to
their perceived risks, and banks were obliged to hold a minimal amount of capital relative to total
risk-weighted assets and off-balance sheet activities.
The second Basel Accord (Basel II), which was first published in 2004 and implemented in most
industrial countries in 2007, can be seen as a refinement of Basel I that introduces a complemen-
tary three pillar concept of bank regulation - minimum capital requirements, supervisory review
(Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process) and market discipline (disclosure requirements).
Amongst other things, it enforced the existing standards by introducing additional capital require-
ments for market risks, in particular interest rate and exchange risks (BCBS, 2005). Basel II also
allowed banks to use their own internal models to evaluate risk, once the models were validated by
the supervisory authority.
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With the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and the perception of a number of weak-
nesses in the existing regulatory framework, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision devel-
oped the third Basel Accord (Basel III) with the aim of implementing it in 2018 (BCBS, 2014b).
It address the perception that the risk weights applied to asset categories have failed to fully re-
flect banks’ portfolio risk causing an increase in systemic risk. To tackle this problem, among other
things, Basel III has introduced a minimum leverage ratio that is independent of risk assessment and
treats all exposures equally. As a result, the new capital regulation consists of three complementary
components: (i) the risk-weighted capital regulation in which capital adequacy is set in relation to
a historical assessment of risks augmented by countercyclical buffers (Drehmann et al. (2010)); (ii)
the stress-testing framework which assesses banks’ resilience to tail risks (BCBS, 2009b); and (iii)
the leverage regulation that is independent of risk assessment.
It is important to note that the Basel III regulation requires the three components to be in
place concomitantly, since each of them addresses a particular vulnerability. For instance, if the
leverage ratio were used in isolation, then the information on individual asset risks would not be
taken into account when assessing capital adequacy. Banks might then be incentivized to shift their
investments from low-risk to high-risk assets. On the other hand, if there were only stress tests and
risk-weighted capital requirements, banks would remain prone to model risk when classifying of
particular assets into risk categories and in estimating future tail risks. Moreover, the problem that
banks may leverage up their balance sheet by investing in assets that appear in the low-risk category
would remain unaddressed.
To sum up, the leverage ratio is intended to act as a complement and a backstop to risk-based
capital requirements. It should counterbalance the build-up of systemic risk by limiting the effects
of risk weight compression during booms. The leverage ratio is therefore expected to act (more)
countercyclically than the risk-weighted asset ratio, being tighter in booms and looser in busts.
2.2 What are the long term net benefits of bank capital regulation?
There is an intense debate between policymakers, industry lobbying groups and academics about
the costs and benefits of bank capital requirements. Earlier contributions by Harrison (2004) and
Brealey (2006) analyze the Basel II package and conclude that no compelling arguments support the
claim that bank equity has a social cost. Focusing on the current crisis, Turner (2010) and Goodhart
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(2010) argue that a significant increase in equity requirements is the most important step regulators
should take to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from
period of excess aggregate credit growth. Acharya et al. (2011), Acharya et al. (2016) and Goodhart
et al. (2010) suggest - in line with the actual implementation of the capital conservation buffer - that
regulators should impose restrictions on dividends and equity pay-outs as part of prudential capital
regulation. Admati et al. (2013) make a clear assessment of the applicability of standard corporate
financial analysis and of the Modigliani-Miller propositions to understanding the economic impact
of the new bank capital regulation and conclude that the benefits are larger than the costs. However,
the authors do not provide any empirical quantification of the net benefits.
There are other papers that try to assess the costs and benefits of higher capital requirements.
One example is Miles et al. (2011) who derive the optimal capital ratio for UK banks. They
calculate costs using a two-step approach (first, estimate the impact of higher capital on lending
spreads; next, estimate the impact of higher lending spreads on output). The key result is that
a 1 percentage point increase in capital requirements causes output to fall by 0.02% (compared
with 0.09 in Angelini et al. (2014) who use a similar set up). In the long term, the increase
in lending spreads caused by a 1 percentage point in the capital requirement is equal to 0.8 basis
points, smaller by a factor of 16 than the estimate by King (2010) of 13 basis points. Given these
costs and taking into account that higher capital also reduces the probability of a banking crisis,
their welfare analysis suggests that the optimal bank capital should be around 20% of risk-weighted
assets. Benes and Kumhof (2015) use a theoretical model to analyze the impact of prudential rules
and a countercyclical capital buffer requirement, similar to the reform proposed in Basel III, and
find that theoretically a buffer requirement has the ability to increase overall welfare by reducing
the volatility of output. More recently, Karmakar (2016) uses a DSGE model with a non-linear
and occasionally binding capital requirement constraint and shows that higher capital requirements
reduce business cycle volatility and raises welfare. He also derives an optimal capital requirement
of 16%, in line with the Basel guidelines.
The Institute of International Finance, (IIF 2011) argues that the economic cost of Basel III - in
terms of foregone real GDP - will be significant, about 0.7% per year over the five years following
the implementation of Basel III. The difference with respect to Miles et al. (2011) depends on several
factors, the most important one being the short time horizon and the lack of any assessments of
the benefits in the long run.
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Corbae and D’Erasmo (2013) develop a dynamic model of banking industry dynamics to inves-
tigate banking regulations, and specifically Basel III, and their effect on industry dynamics. They
find that a rise in capital requirements from 4 to 6% leads to a rise in loan interest rates by about 50
basis points as well as a lower level of GDP, while the cost of deposit insurance falls substantially.
Generally similar results are obtained in the DSGE model presented by Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero
(2012). When the capital requirement is raised by 2 percentage points in their model, loan rates
rise by about 15 basis points, while output falls by slightly less than 1%. Consistently with these
results, Drehmann and Gambacorta (2012) find that the introduction of a countercyclical capital
buffer helps to reduce credit growth during booms and attenuate the credit contraction once it is
released.
An overall assessment of the net benefits (benefits minus costs) of Basel III are reported in the
Long-term Economic Impact study (the so-called LEI report, see BCBS, 2010b). In particular, this
study indicates that the economic costs associated with tighter capital and liquidity standards are
considerably lower than the estimated positive benefit that the reform should have by reducing the
probability of banking crises and their associated banking losses. However, none of the DSGE
models used in this study feature credit risk and the possibility of default, so that the main benefits
of the reform are calculated by considering the reduction in output volatility (see Angelini et al.
(2014)). This is a limitation of our study as too.1
3 Stylized facts about the risk-weighted capital and leverage require-
ments
One aspect that remains to be assessed is if the side-by-side application of risk-weighted capital
and leverage requirements could be of help in preventing the occurrence of a fragile boom and
smoothing the cycle. One of the lessons from the recent financial crisis is that the banks built up a
substantial amount of leverage while apparently maintaining strong risk-based capital ratios. When
the financial markets forced the banks to deleverage rapidly, this put a strong downward pressure
on asset prices. This in turn brought about a decline in bank capital and eventually a credit squeeze
that exacerbated the problem.
1Most models used in the LEIs exercise are of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) family. However,
following a ‘diversification’ approach, a limited number of alternative models (example: semi-structural and vector error
correction models (VECM)) were also used (see Angelini et al., 2015).
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Typically, during booms, risk materialization is low and hence banks have an incentive to en-
gage in profit-making opportunities. It is precisely at this time, that risk weights are low, giving
the impression that banks are sufficiently capitalized and in sound financial health. Overoptimistic
assessment of risk weights lead to large-scale extension of credit and hence decline in lending stan-
dards. The reduction of risk weights could be particularly strong in a period in which interest
rates are low. This is the so-called the risk-taking channel (Borio and Zhu (2008), Adrian and Shin
(2014), Altunbas et al. (2014)) and works not only through a "search for yield" mechanism but
also through the impact of low interest rates on valuations, incomes and cash flows. A reduction
in the policy rate boosts asset and collateral values, which in turn can modify bank estimates of
probabilities of default, loss given default and volatilities. For example, low interest rates by in-
creasing asset prices tend to reduce asset price volatility and thus risk perceptions. Since higher
stock prices increases the value of equity relative to corporate debt, a sharp increase in stock prices
reduces corporate leverage and could thus lessen the risk of holding stocks. All this has a direct
impact on value-at-risk methodologies for economic and regulatory capital purposes (Danielsson et
al. (2004)). As volatility tends to decline in rising markets, it releases the risk budgets of financial
firms and encourages leveraged position-taking. A similar argument is provided in the model by
Adrian and Shin (2014), who stress that changes in measured risk determine adjustments in bank
balance sheets and leverage conditions and that this, in turn, amplifies business cycle movements.
While the procyclical features of risk-weights have been widely discussed, we still lack a precise
quantification of their effects. Brei and Gambacorta (2016) test whether the cyclical sensitivity
of the capital ratios increased from Basel I to Basel II, with the introduction of internal ratings-
based (IRB) models and tailored risk-weights. In particular, they find that the level of the risk-
weighted capital ratios decreased in response to its introduction in 2007, just before the beginning
of the global financial crisis. In a recent paper, Behn, Haselmann and Wachtel (2016) analyze the
effects of changes in risk-weights after the default of Lehman brothers and find that increases in
capital charges caused by procyclical regulation had a strong and economically meaningful impact
on the adjustment of loans over the credit risk shock. In particular, their estimates indicate that,
in response to the shock, IRB banks reduced loans to the same firm by 2.1 to 3.9 percentage points
more when capital charges for the loan were based on internal ratings than when they were based
on fixed risk weights (standardized approach).
When loan quality starts to deteriorate, capital is used to absorb the losses. It is mainly for
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this reason that we need a non risk based measure that will complement the risk based capital
requirements. The leverage ratio indicates the maximum loss that can be absorbed by equity. The
opposite happens during economic downturns. During such times, risk weights are high and hence
the capital requirement constraint tightens but the leverage requirement is unaffected by the changes
in risk weighting and it will be satisfied. The main point is that the two capital requirements need
to work together to limit a boom-bust cycle.
It must be noted that a necessary condition for the minimum LR requirement to act as a cyclical
backstop to the RWRs is that the banks’ exposure expands more strongly during a financial boom
than the corresponding increase in its’ risk-weighted assets. This should make the LR work counter-
cyclically. Indeed, using a large data set covering international banks headquartered in 14 advanced
economies, Brei and Gambacorta (2016) find that the Basel III leverage ratio is significantly more
countercyclical than the risk-weighted regulatory capital ratio: it is a tighter constraint for banks in
booms and a looser constraint in recessions. The main results of Brei and Gambacorta (2016) are
summarized in Table (1). A 1% point increase in real GDP growth is associated with a reduction of
the LR of 5 basis points, while the risk-weighted ratio does not react to GDP movements. Similar
results are obtained using a financial measure of the cycle, the credit gap (the difference between the
credit to GDP ratio and its trend).
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision sets out that the leverage ratio is intended to:
1. Avoid excessive build-up of leverage so that rapid deleveraging, in the event of a crisis, does
not destabilize both the financial and real sectors.
2. Complement the risk-based measures with a simple, non risk-based “backstop” measure.




In this paper, we will explore if the leverage requirement really acts as a backstop to the capital
requirements. Despite the fact that the minimum leverage ratio has already been set at 3%, we
cannot use this as a minimum requirement to calibrate the model because the composition of the
2The total exposure is given by total assets and other commitments. A detailed explanation of the definition of capital
and total exposures can be found in BCBS (2014a).
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credit portfolio of our banks is quite simplified: it does not include interbank loans and more
importantly government bonds (our model does not feature a public sector).3
Following Fender and Lewrick (2015), a useful concept in calibrating the LR in a manner con-
sistent with the existing RWRs (i.e. by taking possible interactions into account) is the "RWA
density" or "density ratio" (DR), defined as the ratio of RWA to the LR exposure measure. The
density ratio denotes the average risk weight per unit of exposure for any given bank or banking sys-







= RWR ∗DR (1)
The LR can thus be expressed as the product of the risk-weighted capital ratio (RWR= Capital/Risk-
weighted assets) and the DR. This relationship can help us calibrate a consistent minimum LR
requirement.
Equation (1) shows how the LR and the RWRs complement each other from a cross-sectional
point of view. If, all else equal, a bank’s risk model underestimates its risk weights, this will bias
the Tier 1 capital ratio upwards. Yet, at the same time, the DR is biased downwards, making a
minimum LR requirement relatively more constraining. Conversely, for a given LR requirement, a
bank with a relatively low DR will have an incentive to shift its balance sheet towards riskier assets
to earn more income - a type of behavior that the RWRs would constrain. This suggests that banks’
risk-weighted capital ratios and the LR provide complementary information when banks’ resilience
is assessed.
The coherence between the LR and the RWR requirement, set by the Basel III regulation at
8.5%, implies the calculation of a plausible value for the DR in the steady state.4 In the context
of our model, banks lend only to households and non-financial firms and we have to reconstruct a
plausible density ratio taking into account: (a) the risk weights for loans to households and non-
3Refer the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) press release dated 11th January,
2016. (http://www.bis.org/press/p160111.htm). There is still an ongoing debate about the possibility of a leverage
surcharge for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). Most of the existing leverage ratio frameworks indicate an
additional surcharge of 1-2% (Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, 2016). The additional surcharge for G-SIBs
on the risk-weighted capital ratio has been already designed by the Basel III regulation following a bucket approach from
1-3.5% (http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs255.pdf). For simplicity, we do not consider such buffers in our model.
4New Basel III regulation has tightened risk-weighted capital requirements. Banks have to meet a 6% Tier 1 capital
ratio (comprising a more broadly defined Tier 1 capital element as numerator); and (ii) maintain an additional capital
conservation buffer of 2.5% (in terms of CET1 capital to RWA). The new minimum could be considered to be 8.5%
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financial firms and (b) the proportion of bank loans to these two sectors in the long run.
The first point can be solved using information in EBA (2011) that reports the average risk
weights implied by the internal models of European banks. In particular, weights are 0.37 for
household lending and 0.92 for lending to non-financial firms. These weights are very similar to
those implied by the standardized approach in Basel I, which are, respectively, 0.35 and 1.00. As for
the second point, we can simply rely on the long-term share of loans to the non-financial sector in
the euro area that is approximately 60% to households and 40% to firms. Taking these values into
account the density ratio is equal to 0.59 (0.37*0.6+0.92*0.4) and from equation (1) it is possible
to derive a plausible value for the minimum LR approximately equal to 5% (8.5*0.59). In our
numerical results, we will use this as a baseline case for the minimum LR requirement. It is worth
stressing that this value is coherent with the calibration of our specific model and should not be
interpreted as a benchmark for the calibration of the actual minimum requirement in the euro area.
4 The model
We build on the model by Gerali et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2014). There are some trade-offs
to using this framework. The framework allows us to study a non-naive financial sector, besides
incorporating credit frictions, borrowing constraints and a set of real and nominal rigidities. The
borrowing constraints are modeled as Iacoviello (2005) while the real and nominal rigidities are
similar to the ones developed in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003). The borrowing constraints and the bank regulatory constraints are always binding and not
occasionally binding. In this section, we discuss the main features of the model. For further details,
we would like to refer the reader to Angelini et al. (2014).
4.1 A brief overview
The flowchart in Figure 1 shows the interactions between the different agents in the economy.
There are two types of households (patient and impatient) who consume, supply labor, accumulate
housing (in fixed supply) and either borrow or lend. The two types of households differ in their
respective discount factors (βP > βI ). The difference in discount factors leads to positive financial
flows in equilibrium. The patient households sell deposits to the banks while the impatient house-
holds borrow, subject to a collateral constraint. The entrepreneurs hire labor from the households,
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and buy capital from the capital goods producers, to produce a homogeneous intermediate good.
The banks accept deposit and supply business and mortgage loans. Similar to the impatient
households, the entrepreneur also faces a collateral constraint while drawing a loan from the bank.
Another useful feature of this model is that the banks are monopolistically competitive. In other
words, they set lending and deposit rates to maximize profits. The banks can only accumulate
capital through retained earnings i.e. we do not allow for equity issuance.
On the production side, there are also monopolistically competitive retailers and capital goods
producers. The retailers buy intermediate goods from the entrepreneurs, differentiate and price
them, subject to nominal rigidities. The capital goods producers help us introduce a price of capital
to study asset price dynamics.
The model also features a monetary authority and a macroprudential authority. The monetary
authority sets policy rates and follows a standard Taylor rule. The macroprudential authority sets
the minimum risk based capital and leverage requirements. We now study the individual agents in
greater detail.
4.2 The patient households












subject to the following budget constraint (in real terms)




t (i) + d
P
t (i) ≤ wPt lPt (i) +
(1 + rdt−1)dPt−1(i)
πt
+ tPt (i), (2)
where πt = PtPt−1 is the rate of inflation. The expected utility depends on current and lagged
consumption cPt , housing hPt and labor hours lPt . There are external habits in consumption. The
household utility is subject to two preference shocks. The shock to consumption is εzt and the shock
to housing demand is εht . They follow independent AR(1) processes. Equation (2) is the budget
constraint. The expenses include consumption, accumulation of housing and selling one period
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deposits to the banks. The receipts are in the form of labor income, gross return on last periods
deposits and some lump-sum transfers tt. The real house price is qht and wPt is the real wage rate.
4.3 The impatient households












subject to the following budget constraint (in real terms)







≤ wIt lIt (i) + bIt (i) + tIt (i) (3)
and the borrowing constraint,







Similar to the patient households, the expected utility of the impatient households depends on
consumption cIt , housing hIt and hours worked lIt and are subject to the same preference shocks.
The budget constraint in this case looks somewhat different from the earlier case. The expenses
consists of consumption, accumulation of housing and servicing of debt bIt−1. The receipts comprise
labor income, new loans and lump-sum transfers.
Equation (4) above represents the households borrowing constraint. This states that the house-
hold can borrow up to the expected value of their housing and mIt is the stochastic LTV ratio for
mortgages.
4.4 The entrepreneurs
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where δ and qkt are the depreciation and price of physical capital, respectively. The competitive
good is produced by the technology,













1−µ, where µ is the share of patient households labor.5
Further, the entrepreneurs are also subject to borrowing constraints. They can also borrow up
to the expected value of their undepreciated capital i.e.





where mEt is the stochastic LTV on entrepreneurial loans. Following Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali
et al. (2010), we choose the value of shocks such that the borrowing constraints always bind in the
neighborhood of the steady state.
4.5 The banks
The banks have market power in setting lending and deposit rates. They adjust loans and deposits
in response to cyclical conditions of the economy while satisfying the balance sheet identity and
the regulatory requirements. Each bank consists of a wholesale unit that manages bank capital and
two retail units that accept deposits and make loans.
4.5.1 The wholesale branch
The wholesale branch operates under perfect competition. On the liabilities side, it combines the
bank capital, Kbt , with the retail deposits, Dt, while on the asset side, it provides funds to the
retail branch to extend differentiated loans, BHt and BEt . There is also a cost associated with the
5A detailed discussion can be found in Iacoviello and Neri (2010).
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wholesale activity. We assume that the banks incurs quadratic costs whenever it deviates from a
required leverage and a risk-weighted asset ratio. These requirements are fixed by the regulator and
hence the bank takes these targets as exogenously given while solving the optimization problem.
The exogenous target incorporates the accelerator mechanism as described by Adrian and Shin
(2010). Essentially, the bank tries to stay close to a constant leverage and risk-weighted asset ratio
and there are costs to deviating from these targets.
There is no equity issuance in the model and therefore bank capital is accumulated through
retained earnings only. The law of motion for bank capital is as follows:
Kbt+1(j) = (1− δb)Kbt (j) + Jbt ,
where Jbt−1 represents the overall profits of the banking group. The wholesale branch chooses loans




















BHt (j) +BEt (j)
−φb)2Kbt (j)]
subject to the balance sheet identity, BHt (j) +BEt (j) −Dbt (j) = Kbt (j)
δb measures the resources used up in the activity of managing bank capital. It could also capture
the idea that owing some exogenous reasons, aggregate bank capital depreciates. This could be
because some borrowers do not payback their loans, fall in asset prices etc. This should not be
interpreted in the same way as the depreciation of physical capital. The value was calibrated to
obtain a steady state capital to total loans ratio of 8.5% and that corresponds to δb = 0.11. The
last two terms in the above expression show the quadratic costs incurred on deviating from the
capital and leverage requirements, respectively. These costs are parametrized by κKb and κLb. The
first-order conditions yield a relationship between the capital position of the bank and the spread
between the wholesale lending and deposit rates. We can write the FOCs for any bank, j, as follows:
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It can be seen that equations (7) and (8) are identical if the risk weights are same i.e. RBHt =
RBEt , if ωEt = ωHt . The left-hand side shows the marginal profits from increasing lending (equal to
the spread) while the right-hand side shows the costs of deviating from the minimum requirements.
We also assume that the bank has access to unlimited finance from the central bank at the policy
rate and thereby by arbitrage, the wholesale deposit rate is equal to the policy rate. Following
Angelini et al. (2014), we model risk weights as follows:
ωit = (1− ρi)ωi + (1− ρi)χi(Yt − Yt−4) + ρiωit−1, i = H,E
In the above equation, ωi corresponds to the steady-state risk weights on household and business
lending. χi < 0 which means the risk weights tend to be low during booms and high during
recessions. The cyclicality of the risk weights is what differentiates a bank’s regulatory capital
ratio from its leverage ratio, following the discussion in Section 3. The law of motion for risk
weights helps us capture the difference between the capital and leverage ratios over the business
cycle. The law of motion for risk weights, though simple, captures one of the main ideas embedded
in the Internal Risk Based (IRB) approach to computing risk weight functions. As we know, credit
risk in a portfolio arises from two sources, systematic and idiosyncratic (BCBS 2006). Systematic
risk represents the effect of unexpected changes in macroeconomic and financial market conditions
on the performance of borrowers, while idiosyncratic risk represents the effects of risks that are
particular to individual borrowers. As a borrower’s portfolio becomes more granular, in the sense
that the larger exposures account for smaller shares of total portfolio exposure, idiosyncratic risk
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can be completely diversified away. The more granular the portfolio, the less is the likelihood
of risk weights responding to idiosyncratic risk. Note that the situation is completely different
for systematic (aggregate) risk as very few firms are completely shielded from the macroeconomic
environment in which they operate. Therefore this risk is undiversifiable and hence can cause the
riskiness of the borrowers to move countercyclically. Our risk-weight function captures a similar
idea and we proxy the undiversifiable systematic (aggregate) factor by output.
4.5.2 The retail branch
A Dixit-Stiglitz framework is assumed for the retail credit and deposit markets. The elasticities
of loan and deposit demand coming from households and entrepreneurs is given by εbst and εdt ,
where s = H,E. These terms will be a major determinant of spreads between bank rates and the
policy rate. We maintain the assumption in Gerali et al. (2010) that each of these elasticity terms
is stochastic. Innovations to interest rate elasticities of loans and deposits can be interpreted as
innovations to bank spreads arising independently of monetary policy. The retail branch takes the
loan and deposit demand schedules as given and then chooses the interest rates to maximize profits.













dt, s = H,E (9)
We observe that the aggregate demand for loans at bank j by impatient households or entrepreneurs
depends on the overall volume of loans to households or entrepreneurs and on the interest rate
charged on loans relative to the rate index for that specific type of loan. We also note that the
aggregate households demand for deposits at bank any bank, "j", depends on the aggregate amount
of deposits in the whole economy, dt.























− 1)2rbEt bEt ], (10)
subject to the loan demand forthcoming from households and entrepreneurs (Equation (9)). The
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first two terms are simply the returns from lending to households and entrepreneurs. The next term
reflects the cost of remunerating funds received from the wholesale branch. The last two terms are
the costs of adjusting the interest rates. After imposing a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order
conditions for interest rates yield:




















] = 0 (11)
The discount factor is equal to the one of patient households because they own the bank. It can be
seen that the retail rates depend on the markup and the wholesale rate (the marginal cost for the
bank) which in turn depends on the banks capital position and the policy rate. A similar equation
can be derived for the deposit retail branch:




















] = 0 (12)
It can be seen from equations (11) and (12) that when prices are perfectly flexible, the lending rates
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Thus total bank profits are total receipts from retail loans less deposit costs, costs of deviating
from the leverage and capital requirement regulations, and interest rate adjustment costs.
4.6 Retailers and capital goods producers
Capital goods producers buy undepreciated capital from entrepreneurs and final goods from re-
tailers to produce new capital which is sold back to entrepreneurs, at price Qkt . This process of
6Retail and wholesale branches taken together and ignoring within group transactions.
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transforming the final goods into capital goods entails adjustment costs. Following Bernanke et
al. (1999), the retail goods producers are assumed to be monopolistically competitive. They face
nominal rigidities and their price is indexed to a combination of past and steady inflation. They
face quadratic adjustment costs to change prices beyond what is allowed by indexation.
4.7 Monetary and macroprudential policy
There are a few more ingredients that warrant discussion, namely the monetary authority and the
macroprudential authority.
The monetary authority sets policy rates according to a standard Taylor rule:








where φy and φπ are the weights attached to output and inflation growth respectively and εrt is a
white noise monetary policy shock.
The macroprudential setup is different in this paper with respect to Angelini et al. (2014). The
macroprudential authority sets a time-varying capital requirement and a fixed leverage requirement,
that banks must comply with at all times. As discussed earlier, there are costs to deviating from
these exogenously set targets. Time-varying capital requirements follow:










where χν > 0 would imply the presence of a countercyclical capital buffer. The objective of having
such time-varying capital requirements is to increase bank capital when the loan to output ratio
deviates away from its steady-state level (Drehmann and Gambacorta (2012)). The countercyclical
capital buffer used in the model follows Basel III recommendations (BCBS, 2010). Credit-to-GDP
gaps are valuable early warning indicators for systemic banking crises. As such, they are useful for
identifying vulnerabilities and can help guide the deployment of macroprudential tools such as the
build-up of countercyclical capital buffers (Drehmann et al. 2010).
Lastly, to close the model, we specify the main market clearing condition. The aggregate output
in the economy is divided into consumption, accumulation of physical and bank capital, and the
various adjustment costs.
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where Ct = cPt + cIt + cEt is the aggregate consumption, It is aggregate investment undertaken, and
Kbt+1 is the aggregate bank capital. The term Adjt includes all adjustment costs. In the housing
market, equilibrium is given by h = hPt (i) + hIt (i), where h is the fixed housing stock.
5 Calibration
Most of the parameters used are the ones estimated in Gerali et al. (2010). The main parameters
are reported in Table 2. The discount factor is identical for the impatient households and the
entrepreneurs. The steady-state risk-weighted capital requirement is set at 8.5% which includes a
core Tier 1 requirement of 6% and a conservation buffer of 2.5%. As discussed earlier, the model
calibration of the leverage ratio is sensitive to the steady-state risk weights. To illustrate this point
a bit further, we use Figure 2 to plot equation (1). On the x and y axis, we alter the risk-weights
on mortgage and firm lending while on the z axis we plot the leverage ratio. As is intuitive, the
leverage ratio is increasing in either of the steady-state risk weights. In terms of equation (1), this
is because an increase in either of the two risk weights increases the risk weight density, thereby
increasing the minimum leverage requirement. Intuitively, when the overall economic scenario is
more risky, it is prudent to hold more capital. Our baseline calibration corresponds to steady-state
risk weights of 0.37 on household lending and 0.92 on entrepreneurial lending. Given that the
steady-state risk-weighted capital ratio requirement and that the share of lending to households vs.
firms is 60-40, we calibrate the leverage ratio to be 5%. We also report the results of using the
standardized risk weights for the calibration i.e. 0.35 and 1.00 for mortgage to households and firm
lending respectively.
The depreciation of physical capital (δ) is set to get an annual depreciation of 10%. The mark-
ups in the goods and labor markets are assumed to be 25% and 20% yielding values of εl = 5 and
εy = 6 respectively. The weight of housing in the utility function is taken from Iacoviello and Neri
(2010) and is set at εh = 0.2. The LTV ratio on mortgage lending is set at 70% and this is in line
with the average LTV ratio, for mortgages, in Europe and the USA, Calza et al. (2013).7 The LTV
7Refer Table 1 of the working paper version here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1069.pdf
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ratios for entrepreneurs is set at 35%. Christensen et al. (2007) estimate a value of 0.32 for Canada,
in which firms can borrow against capital while Gerali et al. (2010) computed a number close to
0.40 for the euro area. Based on this evidence, we set the LTV for entrepreneurial lending at 0.35.8
The calibration of the TFP shock is standard, as it is adopted from the business cycle literature.
Regarding the parameters of the law of motion for the risk weights, we use the estimated param-
eters from Angelini et al. (2011).9 The parameters χH , χE , ρH , and ρE are set at, respectively, -10,
-15, 0.94, and 0.92. Regarding the steady-state risk weights, we experiment with two sets of values.
The first set corresponds to the European Banking Authority figures (ωH = 0.37 and ωE = 0.92)
while the second set corresponds to the standardized risk weighting approach (ωH = 0.35 and
ωE = 1.00). The costs of deviating from the regulatory capital and leverage ratio requirements i.e.
κKb and κLb are set at 8.00 and 7.63 respectively. The former targets a steady state capital to risk
weighted asset ratio of 8.5% while the latter targets a steady state leverage ratio of 5%.
6 Results
We will analyze the response of the economy to two shocks, namely a positive technology shock
and a shock to the loan-to-value ratio for entrepreneurial lending. We will also conduct some
exercises with alternative values of the leverage ratio to understand the costs and benefits of the
same.
6.1 Response to a positive technology shock
We analyze the response of some key variables in response to a unit standard deviation shock to
total factor productivity. Figure 3 illustrates the main mechanism of the model. The left-hand panel
shows how the risk weights decline during booms. The decline in risk weights could encourage
excessive risk taking during booms and this is precisely what the leverage ratio aims to correct.
The right panel shows how the leverage ratio and the risk-sensitive capital ratio evolve after the
incidence of the shock. The mechanism is the following. During booms, lending to households and
8This is also the number used in Gerali et al. (2010).
9They use data on delinquency rates on loans to households and non-financial corporations in the US as proxies for
the probabilities of default on these loans (similar data for the euro area were not available). They input these time series
into the Basel II capital requirements formula, and, using a series of assumptions concerning the other key variables of
the formula, they back out the time series for the risk weights. Next they estimate the law of motion for the risk-weights
equation to obtain the parameters. For more details, we refer the reader to Appendix 1 of Angelini et al. (2011).
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firms increases, driving down the leverage and the capital ratio. However, risk weights also decline
and therefore the decline in the leverage ratio (non-risk-sensitive) is larger than the capital-to-RWA
ratio. This increases costs for the bank because it deviates more from the regulatory requirements.
In the absence of the leverage requirement, the bank would continue to expand lending. It is in
this way that the leverage ratio restricts a credit cycle boom. It is intuitive to see that the opposite
would happen in an economic downturn. In that scenario, the capital ratio would be the more
binding constraint as the risk weights also tend to increase. Thus the leverage ratio is intended
to be the constraining ratio in booms and the milder constraint in a downturn. In Figure 4 we
report the impulse response of some other key variables of the model. In the top panels, we show
the IRFs of loan to output ratio and the total lending: precisely the variables the macroprudential
instruments target. In the lower panel, we show the two most important real variables, namely,
output and investment. These figures clearly highlight the benefits of introducing the leverage ratio
requirement in addition to the risk weighted ratio requirement. Volatility in the credit cycle is
reduced substantially, which also translates into a moderation of the real series.
Although there are clear gains from introducing the minimum leverage requirement for banks,
there are also some associated costs. Table 3 addresses this question. Following the literature, we
base our analysis on the impact on output (Gerali et al. (2010) and Angelini et al. (2014)). We show
the leverage requirement’s effect in reducing the steady-state level and volatility of output. For the
sake of robustness, this analysis is done for two different sets of steady-state risk weights. The first
set of values corresponds to the European Banking Authority figures (ωH = 0.37 and ωE = 0.92)
while the second set corresponds to the standardized risk weighting approach (ωH = 0.35 and
ωE = 1.00). The EBA risk weights would imply a minimum leverage requirement of approximately
5% while the standardized approach would imply 5.20%.10 We observe that, conditional on the
choice of steady-state risk weights, the leverage requirement generates a loss in steady-state output in
the range of 0.7− 1.7%. On the other hand, the reduction in output variability is quite substantial
(24 − 28%). To put these magnitudes in perspective, we make a comparison with other studies
that have evaluated the impact of Basel III. Similar results are obtained in the DSGE model by
Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2012). When the capital requirement is raised by two percentage points
in their model, loan rates rise by about 15 basis points, while output falls by slightly less than 1
10Assuming that the minimum risk-weighted capital requirement is 8.5% and the share of mortgage lending to house-
holds is 0.6.
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per cent. Simulation conducted in BCBS (2010) using a wide range of econometric tools, mostly
DSGE models, finds that on average a 2% increase in risk-weighted capital requirements leads to a
reduction in the steady-state output of 0.2% and output volatility of 2.6%. Our numbers indicate
that introducing the leverage ratio produce somewhat larger costs on steady state output but the
benefits in terms of reduction of output volatility are substantially larger.
6.2 A shock to the loan-to-value ratio
In this section, we conduct an alternative check by analyzing the response to a shock to the LTV
ratio for entrepreneurial loans. More specifically, we analyze a one-time rise in the LTV ratio by 20
percentage points. This corresponds to the average increase in the LTV ratio experienced in the euro
area in the pre-crisis period: from 60% in 2003 to 80% in 2007 (Mercer Oliver Wyman (2003) and
ECB (2009)). We present results for the shock to the LTV on entrepreneurial lending but the shock
to LTV on mortgage lending was also analyzed and the results are qualitatively similar. Figures 5 - 6
and Table 4 present the results. Figure 5 presents the impact on the risk weights and the regulatory
ratios, after the incidence of the shock, with both the regulatory minima operating. Similar to the
case of the TFP shock, we find that the leverage ratio declines much more than the risk-weighted
capital ratio, causing the leverage requirement to bind earlier. This is once again driven by the
decline in risk weights and because the bank accumulates capital relatively slowly. On impact, the
lending responds first, leading to a decline in both ratios. This is the almost instantaneous volume
effect. But with the higher LTV, interest rates are also higher. Once interest rates start increasing,
the banks profits and capital also start increasing. This leads to a gradual recovery in the regulatory
ratios. Figure 6 once again reports the impulse response of the main variables following the shock.
Note that in contrast to the TFP shock, the risk weights in this case decline much less and this is
partly due to the way the risk weights have been modeled: The productivity shock affects output
and risk weights directly but this is not the case in the present scenario. Table 4 represents the
cost-benefit analysis in this scenario. The main insights are similar to the ones presented in Table
3. We represent the theoretical moments from the simulation of the model, with the LTV shock
operative. The last column highlights the fact that the reduction in the volatility is substantially
higher than the reduction in levels. This is all the more evident in the lending variables. This
is intuitive as the principal aim of imposing the minimum leverage requirement is to reduce the
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volatility of the credit cycle. It should be mentioned here that we are not analyzing a shock to
house prices separately, as the dynamics of a house price shock are qualitatively similar to the LTV
shock, in the model. A rise in house prices would relax borrowing constraints, which would lead
to higher credit growth. The benefits of introducing the leverage ratio in such a situation will be
identical.
6.3 Altering the sensitivity of risk weights to output
The main reason for introducing the leverage ratio requirement is that risk weights tend to be
cyclical and that, during booms, the risk-weighted capital ratio may not be a good indicator of a
bank’s capital situation. Therefore, a natural question to ask is: how does the role of the leverage
ratio change as the cyclicality of risk weights is altered? Table 5 reports the standard deviations
of the loan-to-output ratio, total loans, output, and consumption. The baseline case corresponds
to the calibration by Angelini et al. (2014). The second case is a thought experiment where we
increase the sensitivity by a factor of ten.11 We report the theoretical second moment from a 1000
period simulation conditional on the occurrence of the productivity shock. We find that, when
risk weights tend to be highly countercyclical, the introduction of the leverage ratio is much more
effective in controlling the volatilities in the system. The decline in standard deviations is quite large
and more so for the lending variables, which is precisely what the leverage ratio aims to control.
7 Conclusion
The main benefit of bank capital requirements is to make the financial system more resilient, re-
ducing the probability of banking crises and their associated output losses. However, the global
financial crisis has highlighted the limitations of risk-sensitive bank capital ratios (regulatory capi-
tal divided by risk-weighted assets). To tackle this problem the Basel III regulatory framework has
introduced a minimum leverage ratio, defined as a banks Tier 1 capital over an exposure measure,
which is independent of risk assessment. This paper seeks to answer three questions: 1) How does
the leverage ratio behave over the cycle compared with the risk-weighted asset ratio?; 2) What are
the costs and the benefits of introducing a leverage ratio?; 3) What can we learn about the behav-
11Note that this is just a thought experiment to gain intuition. One could experiment with any other sensitivities as
well.
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ior of the two ratios in the long run and their optimal calibration? To this end, we have used a
medium sized DSGE model that features a banking sector, financial frictions, and economic agents
with differing degrees of creditworthiness as a means of evaluating the regulator’s problem. In
particular, we build on the model by Angelini et al. (2014), augmenting it in two ways. First,
we introduce a leverage ratio, independent of risk assessment, whose deviation from the minimum
requirements produces additional capital adjustment costs. Second, we allow the risk weights on
lending to households and non-financial firms to be different in the steady state. This modification
allows us to mimic the real characteristics of the evolution of bank-risk-setting behavior and to
generate different interest rates for the two classes of loans. We document three main findings: 1)
The leverage ratio acts as a backstop to the risk-sensitive capital requirement: it is a tight constraint
during a boom and a soft constraint in a bust; 2) the net benefits of introducing the leverage ratio
could be substantial; 3) the steady state value of the regulatory minima for the two ratios strongly
depends on the riskiness and the composition of bank lending portfolios.
Our paper presents a novel analysis on the interaction between the leverage ratio requirement
and risk weighted capital requirement, but the simplified nature of the model used does not allow
us to treat all aspects of the problem. In particular, the model does not feature an inherent source
of inefficiency which regulation would be targeted to correct. For this reason, we maintain the
analysis on a purely positive ground and simply study the dynamics of the two regulatory ratios
and how the cyclicality of risk weights drives a wedge between them. One possible extension could
be to introduce explicitly a source of market failure (together with credit risk and bank default) and
to conduct a fully-fledged welfare analysis. This is an interesting area of analysis for future research.
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Table 1: Cyclicality of capital Ratios
Models Business Cycle Financial Cycle









Baseline model -0.052** -0.048 -0.005* -0.003
(0.026) (0.038) (0.003) (0.004)
Controlling for different regimes of capital regulation -0.055** -0.045 -0.005* 0.004
(0.026) (0.037) (0.003) (0.004)
Source: Brei and Gambacorta (2016). (1) The empirical specification in the baseline model includes bank-specific con-
trols, bank-fixed effects and a lagged value of the dependent variable. The model is estimated with GMM and allows for
the presence of a structural break during the global financial crisis. (2) The second model controls for (i) the shift from
Basel I to Basel II, and (ii) the presence of an additional leverage ratio requirement in Canada and US. The figures show
the impact after one year of a 1% increase in the cycle measure (1995-2007).
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Table 2: Calibration
Parameter Symbol Value Target/Source
Discount Rate Patient βP 0.99 Annual risk free rate of 4%
Discount Rate Impatient βI 0.975 Iacoviello (2005)
Discount Rate Entrepreneurs βE 0.975 Iacoviello (2005)
Habit Formation aP , aI , aE 0.86 Gerali at al. (2010)
SS Capital Requirement νb 0.085 Basel committee guidelines
Leverage Requirement φb 0.05 Basel committee guidelines
Depreciation (physical capital) δ 0.025 Annual 10%
Depreciation (bank capital) δb 0.11 SS capital/loan ratio = 8.5%
Adj. Cost (bank capital) κKb 8.00 RW capital ratio (SS) = 8.5%
Adj. Cost (bank capital) κLb 7.63 Leverage ratio (SS) = 5%
Share of Capital α 0.25 Standard
Goods mkt. markup εh 6 Gerali et al. (2010)
Lab. mkt. markup εl 5 Gerali et al. (2010)
Inverse of Frisch Elasticity of labor supply φ 0.5 Labor supply elasticity = 2
Utility fn. weight of housing εht 0.2 Iacoviello & Neri (2010)
LTV household mIt 0.70 Calza et al. (2013)
LTV firms mEt 0.35 Gerali et al. (2010)
Markdown deposits εd −1.46 Gerali et al. (2010)
Markup Mortgage εbH 2.79 Gerali et al. (2010)
Markup Firms εbE 3.12 Gerali et al. (2010)
Persistence of TFP shock ρA 0.90 Std. business cycle literature
Volatility of TFP shock σ2u 0.01 Std. business cycle literature
Mean of TFP A 1.00 Std. business cycle literature
Persistence of house pref. shock ρεh 0.96 Iacoviello & Neri (2010)
Volatility of house pref. shock σεh 0.043 Iacoviello & Neri (2010)
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Table 3: Costs Vs Benefits
ωH = 0.35, ωE = 1.00 ωH = 0.37, ωE = 0.92
⇒ φb = 0.052 ⇒ φb = 0.050
Output Yss σY Yss σY
K 0.2196 0.0839 0.2232 0.0796
K+L 0.2180 0.0605 0.2194 0.0599
% decline 0.70 28.48 1.70 24.75
Consumption Css σY Css σY
K 0.1166 0.0686 0.1165 0.0664
K+L 0.1106 0.0537 0.1100 0.0534
% decline 5.14 21.72 5.51 19.57
Loan/Output (L/Y)ss σL/Y (L/Y)ss σL/Y
K 0.9448 0.1845 0.9541 0.1829
K+L 0.9355 0.1612 0.9435 0.1625
% decline 1.00 12.62 1.11 11.15
Tot. Loans Lss σL Lss σL
K 1.1735 0.1858 1.1813 0.1805
K+L 1.1645 0.1624 1.1784 0.1604
% decline 0.80 12.59 0.20 11.13
Note: This table reports the theoretical moments from a thousand period simulation of the model conditional on the
TFP shock occurring. We simulate the model with and without the leverage ratio requirement. We also conduct the
analysis for two different sets of steady state risk weights.
Table 4: Shock to the LTV ratio on entrepreneurial loans
Variable Moments K K+ L % decline
Output Mean 0.2566 0.2514 2.02
SD 0.0391 0.0371 5.11
Consumption Mean 0.1353 0.1311 3.10
SD 0.0323 0.0307 4.96
Loan to Output Mean 0.9260 0.9250 0.11
SD 1.2093 1.1085 8.33
Total Loans Mean 1.1826 1.1772 0.46
SD 1.2204 1.1175 8.46
Note: This table reports the theoretical moments from a thousand period simulation of the model conditional on the
LTV shock occurring. The loan to value ratio for entrepreneurial lending is shocked to increase 20pp from 35%. We
report the mean and standard deviations for our key variables of interest, namely, output, consumption, loan to output
ratio and the total lending.
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Table 5: Altering the sensitivity of risk weights to output
Baseline Case High Sensitivity
K K+L % decline K K+L % decline
Loan to Output Ratio 0.186 0.161 13.44 0.235 0.166 29.37
Total Loans 0.186 0.162 12.90 0.263 0.177 32.69
Output 0.085 0.061 28.23 0.086 0.056 34.88
Consumption 0.070 0.054 22.85 0.071 0.052 26.76
Note: This table reports the theoretical moments from a thousand period simulation of the model conditional on the
TFP shock occurring. The exercise is repeated for a scenario in which the risk weights are ten times more countercyclical
than the first case. We find that when the risk weights are highly sensitive to output fluctuations, there can be larger
gains from introducing the leverage ratio requirement.
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